

# Collective Action, Rationality, and Hegemonic Stability

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INTA 6302: International Political Economy

# What We Used to Believe

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
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Why should an individual invest effort when s/he can enjoy the benefit and devote resources to other interests?



# The Logic of Collective Action

Public Goods



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Non-rivalrous

My benefit doesn't diminish your benefit

# The Logic of Collective Action

## Public Goods

### Non-rivalrous

My benefit doesn't diminish your benefit

### Non-excludable

You can't stop me from benefiting

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## Public Goods and Group Sizes

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## Public Goods and Group Sizes

- Costly Public Goods can exist without coercion in small groups.
- Even so, they tend to be contributed to in suboptimal quantities.
- The larger the group, the more suboptimal the contribution sizes
- The larger the group, the less likely the public good is sustainable without an exogenous enforcement mechanism.

# The Logic of Collective Action

The Free Rider Problem:



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The Free Rider Problem:

Consider public good  $X$ ;  
 $X$  is non-excludable,  
And  $X$  is being paid into,  
 $\therefore$  Why should I pay in?



# The Logic of Collective Action

## Public Goods and the State




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
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## The Free Rider Size Dynamic




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
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## The Free Rider Size Dynamic



*The Small exploit the Great!*

