

# DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

## POLICY UPDATE



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1 December 2010



# PURPOSE



**To update the National Security Council on joint strategic policy recommendations regarding recent provocations by the DPRK**



# AGENDA



- ❖ **Situation & Relevance (DoS)**
- ❖ **Intelligence Update (DoD)**
- ❖ **Political – Military Considerations (DoS)**
- ❖ **Updated Policy Recommendations**
  - **Defense Updates (DoD)**
  - **Diplomatic Initiatives (DoS)**



# SITUATIONAL SUMMARY



- ❖ **U.S. policy toward the DPRK has not measurably curtailed DPRK efforts to obtain nuclear weapons**
- ❖ **DPRK remains outside of international mainstream**
- ❖ **DPRK actions are assessed to be a deliberate effort to shore up internal support for the Kim Jong il/Un succession**
- ❖ ***DPRK is not assessed to desire a resumption of a state of active war***



# SITUATIONAL RELEVANCE



- ❖ **DPRK is creating a situation that could result in an unintentional escalation into general war**
- ❖ **Security dilemma presents an opportunity for DPRK to transfer fissile materials to outside non-state actors**
- ❖ **Opportunity to press China on exerting influence on the DPRK as well as update U.S. policy**



# INTELLIGENCE UPDATE – RECENT VIOLATIONS –



- ❖ **Escalating DPRK violations of 1953 Armistice:**
  - 26 MAR: ROK vessel sunk on 26 March**
  - 29 OCT: opened fire on ROK soldiers in DMZ**
  - 23 NOV: DPRK fired artillery on ROK territory**
- ❖ **DPRK violations of UNSCR 1874 revealed 13 NOV**
- ❖ **Issued public warning prescheduled U.S. war games in region was leading the area into war**




# INTELLIGENCE UPDATE – UNSCR 1874 VIOLATIONS –




**1 5-megawatt reactor:** The centerpiece of the facilities. Estimates differ as to how much plutonium — a key ingredient in nuclear weapons — has been produced.

**2 Potential 50-megawatt reactor:** It has not been completed but could produce plutonium in far higher quantities than the smaller reactor.

**3 Radiochemical laboratory:** It has the potential of extracting weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods.



**4 Fuel fabrication complex:** Fuel rods can be made here out of natural uranium, which North Korea has in abundance.





# INTELLIGENCE UPDATE – INTEL ASSESSMENT –



## ❖ Most Probable Course of Action:

***Conduct periodic violations of the 1953 armistice framework and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 in an effort to gather internal political support for the Kim Jong-un succession***

## ❖ Most Dangerous Course of Action:

***Conduct conventional or nuclear strike against ROK population centers to resume a general state of war***



# POLITICAL - MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS



- 1. Potential for escalation of conflict remains high**
- 2. U.S. must not be perceived as building up a capacity in the region to conduct a strike against the DPRK**
- 3. Relocation of nuclear munitions on the peninsula could have potentially serious 2<sup>nd</sup> & 3<sup>rd</sup> order impacts**
- 4. Instability may effect a global economic recovery**
- 5. U.S. – Chinese summit in January**
- 6. Domestic & international support for military punitive measures is low**



# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

## – SHORT TERM GOALS –



### DEFENSE GOALS

- Prevent provocations from altering existing and prescheduled DoD activities
- **Conduct prudent planning and positioning of strategic forces against MDCOA scenario**
- Deter further DPRK short-term aggression against ROK or U.S. interests

### DIPLOMATIC GOALS

- Mitigate DPRK ability to cause disruption on world stage
- Calm East Asian markets
- Shore up international resolve and U.S. legitimacy for action against DPRK in the event MDCOA scenario occurs
- Prevent ROK hardliners from forcing ROK escalation



# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS – SHORT TERM NESTING –



|    | MILITARY MOVEMENTS   | DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS  |
|----|--|---|
| 1. | Do not shift nuclear munitions into the theater  | Avoid potential escalation of crisis and backlash from Chinese and Russian Federation over nuclear redeployment                       |
| 2. | Do not realign conventional land units into theater; Do not upgrade alert status of the SRF  | Avoid appearance of escalating crisis and mitigate DPRK perception of existential threats   |
| 3. | Continue scheduled war game and naval operations but avoid disputed air and sea space  | Downplay but publicize scheduled war games  |
| 4. | Reposition SSBN assets in Atlantic for short notice strike on DPRK (conventional or nuclear) in the event of most-dangerous scenario | Quietly communicate U.S. deterrence redlines to DPRK through back-door diplomatic channels utilizing Chinese and allied nation assets |



# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS – SHORT TERM NESTING –



|     | DEFENSE UPDATES  | DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES   |
|-----|--|--|
| 5.  | <b><u>24-Hour Operational Alerts:</u></b><br>40 <sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Wing<br>USLFTCOM – ATL SSBN Assets | Alert NATO, SEATO of military movements<br><br>Request use of allied air space and territorial waters and forward logistical bases in the event of worst-case scenario |
| 6.  | <b><u>72-Hour Operational Alerts:</u></b><br>USSOCOM<br>USFLTFORCOM-ATL  |  |
| 7.  | Maintain continuous<br>USFLTFORCOM-ATL carrier group presence in Region  |  |
| 9.  |  | Leverage UNSC for condemnation of 23 Nov violations  |
| 10. |  | Conduct joint high-level talks between SecState & ROK  |



# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS – LONG TERM GOALS –



## DEFENSE GOALS

- Develop strategic capacity for zero-notice operations to secure or capture fissile material
- Protect U.S. and allied interests in region from long-term DPRK military adventurism and disruptive efforts
- **Begin earnest development of U.S. – Chinese military ties**

## DIPLOMATIC GOALS

- Develop joint efforts with allies to share intelligence and prevent proliferation
- Depend East Asian interdependency to reduce strategic worth of DPRK to Chinese interests
- Provide incentives to encourage Chinese intervention in DPRK policy
- **Begin active regime weakening strategic covert activities**



# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS – LONG TERM PROGRAMS –



|     | DEFENSE UPDATES   | DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES  |
|-----|---|---|
| 11. | Conduct active planning and interdiction operations against buyers seeking North Korean fissile materials | Presidential statement outlining U.S. policy against buyers of WMD materials                        |
| 12. | Deepen regional military ties through scheduled SEATO joint military exercises                            | Encourage deepening of trade relations between China, ROK, and Vietnam.                             |
| 13. |   | Maintain international pressure for unconditional resumption of Six Party Talks                     |
| 14. |   | Leverage Chinese desires for successful summit to increase pressure for intervention in DPRK policy |



# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS – LONG TERM PROGRAMS –



|     | DEFENSE UPDATES   | DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES  |
|-----|---|---|
| 15. | Continue JSOC planning to capture or secure Korean fissile materials in the event of unexpected or uncontrolled regime collapse | Leverage strategic covert intelligence and allied assets to begin in-depth operations against seams in the Kim Jong il regime and succession opponents to encourage economic or regime collapse |
| 16. | Propose joint U.S. – Chinese military exercises to develop strategic relationships  |   |

# QUESTIONS ?

