

## *du Jour and de Facto Policy*

Abstract: Counter proliferation research, development, testing and execution spending is intended to follow the guidance of policy documents issued by the White House and upper echelons of Defense Department. Using a military analytical framework to categorize counter proliferation programs, we propose that the policies discussed in the high-level documents do not necessarily equate to actual differences in spending. In particular, funding for missile defense programs grossly outstrips funding for other counterproliferation programs, though the policy suggested the inverse relationship should exist.

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Defense spending represents a staggering \$738 Billion of the 2011 U.S. national budget<sup>1</sup>. And yet, what exactly does that sum purchase for the United States? High-level policy documents suggest that the U.S. should spend disproportionately on counter proliferation efforts. More specifically, the vocabulary of the relevant documents suggests differences in relative spending levels between the differing missions of counter proliferation, and in relative spending between weapon-type defense systems.

Using an analytical framework developed by the military to categorize counter proliferation programs, we propose that the policies discussed in the high-level documents do not necessarily equate to actual differences in spending. The next section examines the architecture of the Defense Department's policy and budgeting system, and a breakdown of the policy guidance relevant to counter proliferation programs. The subsequent section discusses the coding methodology and findings of our analysis, and the final section concludes.

### ***du jour* Policy: What the U.S. Writes Down**

The most fundamental budget document for a Department of Defense (DoD) research program is the R-1 form. The R-1 form provides vital details about each program, including the actual budget allocation for the prior year, requested allocations for the current year, and projected request for the subsequent year. Other relevant information such as the motivation for the program may also appear in its text<sup>2</sup>. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), for instance, includes this in the text of its R-1 forms:

Tasking for this mission is contained in the National Security Strategy, Unified Command Plan, National Strategy to Combat WMD, Counter proliferation

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<sup>1</sup> Office of Management and Budgeting. "Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 2011". <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/budget.pdf>

<sup>2</sup>Defense Acquisition University. "DoD Budget". <https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=362498>

Interdiction, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Military Strategy, Strategic Planning Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance, National Military Strategy for Combating WMD, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (including the Nuclear Annex), Security Cooperation Guidance, Quadrennial Defense Review, Nuclear Posture Review, and Defense Transformation Planning Guidance<sup>3</sup>.

This extensive list of documents walks from the highest level of government down to the most specific policy documents not specifying distribution of funds for particular programs. If each of these informs DTRA programs, then the language of the guidance put forth in the documents with respect to relative valuation of the various strategic goals supported by the Defense Department should be a predictor for the allocation of funding.

The documents guiding national policy and, in particular, defense policy are not restricted to DTRA in their scope. Guidance concerning such policies should, in theory, affect all defense programs. More specifically, policies relevant to defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are laid out in every layer of defense policy documentation. It is for this reason that funding for counter proliferation programs is the element of this analysis.

Not all policy documents are created equally. The highest layer of national security documents is the National Security Strategy (NSS), a document written by the National Security Council (NSC) and published by the White House. Its function was defined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)<sup>4</sup>. Because it is the highest level of strategic policy promulgated, it also tends to be the most general of U.S. strategic documents. The DoD is expected to draft the Quadrennial Defense Reviews and National Military Strategies to reflect the policies elucidated in the

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<sup>3</sup>Defense Threat Reduction Agency. "Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates, February 2008: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide". February 2008.  
[http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2009/budget\\_justification/pdfs/03\\_RDT\\_and\\_E/Vol\\_5\\_Other\\_Defense\\_Agencies/DTRA%20PB09%20RDTE.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2009/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/Vol_5_Other_Defense_Agencies/DTRA%20PB09%20RDTE.pdf)

<sup>4</sup>Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5.  
[http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title\\_10.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm)

National Security Strategy; however, the National Security Strategy has been consistently late in its publication, and so the DoD policy documents are generally drafted without the benefit of their superior document<sup>5</sup>.

From these three documents published by White House and Joint Staff, The Undersecretary of Defense (Planning) liaises with the combatant commanders in order to create the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The SPG is the first internal step in the DoD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), the system which handles allocation of funds for research projects. The SPG is intended to be "resource informed"—that is, it should propose strategy that is financially and technically feasible. The SPG defines the top-line values for components of the DoD, but it does not provide much specificity (i.e., it is not "resource constrained"). Instead, this need is fulfilled by another document, called the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG). The JPG identifies the needs of combatant commands and calls for those needs to be met with specific developmental goalposts and metrics. This is followed by a slew of Program Objective Memoranda (POMs, one for each program), which can be amended with supplemental documents called Program Decision Memoranda (PDM). Altogether these make up the Programming phase of the process. The aforementioned documents (POMs and PDMs) are considered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller in the drafting of the budget and the Program Budget Decisions (PBD). If any entity within the DoD wishes to appeal PBDs, they can issue a Major Budget Issue (MBI) directly to the Secretary of Defense, who will consider the case. The semi-finalized budget is then wrapped into the Presidential budget to be submitted to the Office of Management and Budgeting (OMB) and Congress<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Adams, Gordon, and Cindy Williams. *Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for its Global Role and Safety at Home*. New York: Routledge, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> Schwartz, Moshe. "Defense Acquisitions: How DoD Acquires Weapons Systems." Congressional Research Service, 2010

The OMB juggles three budgets at any given time: the one being implemented presently, next year's and the following year's. OMB engages the DoD in a unique joint review process to reconcile the proposed DoD budget with the White House. OMB has access to draft Program Budget Decisions and may propose its own PBDs for the DoD. Congressional Budgeting, on the other hand, is not unlike any other congressional activity. It is debated, passed from subcommittee to committee, and passed from committee to the floors. When passed both houses, the separate authorization and appropriations bills are sent to the White House to be signed into law. The authorization of funding does not guarantee their appropriation, distinguishing the sums defined in the two bills.<sup>7</sup>

Altogether, this process is the means by which the DoD discerns how research, development, Testing and Execution (RDT&E) funds will be distributed among research programs. In order to trace the derivation of any specific spending policy, it is necessary to begin with the National Security Strategy and move downward through the relevant topical policy documents.

As it relates to WMD counter proliferation, the most recent (2010) NSS is expectedly vague. It lays out five broad goals in support of counter proliferation: Pursue a World free of Nuclear Weapons, Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Present a Clear Choice to Iran and North Korea, Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Weapons Material, Support Peaceful Nuclear Energy, and Counter Biological Threats<sup>8</sup>. There are several glaring absences from this strategic guidance, most notably any strategic framework for approaching threats. It also fails to mention chemical weapons or ballistic missile defense.

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<sup>7</sup> Adams and Williams. *Buying National Security*

<sup>8</sup> The White House, *The 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.  
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf)

The failure of the NSS to present the aforementioned elements is not surprising. The strategic framework for addressing threats falls clearly more into the purview of lower-level documents. Instead, the NSS is a reflection of those policies which must be emphasized over past priorities, given the current security environment. Chemical Weapons, while arguably the most widely used weapons of mass destruction throughout history, are also among the easiest weapons against which a population may be protected. This is a reflection of a larger move by policy and academic thinkers alike away from categorizing chemicals as a current weapon of mass destruction, and instead attributing them to past warfare. What is more telling is the absence of any mention of ballistic missile defense in this section: the document discusses ballistic missile defense *separately* from counter proliferation, suggesting that the administration wishes to decouple the two issues.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (drafted and released prior to the NSS) takes a more aggressive stance against proliferation, calling it a “top national priority.” The document singles out its own (more tangible) strategic counter proliferation goals<sup>9</sup>. The QDR does explicitly mention chemical weapons, though it cites no real efforts to address the threat, whereas each of the other points relate to a specific initiative, program, or institution. Any discussion of ballistic missile defense is separated from counter proliferation, advancing the belief that the administration seeks to decouple the two issues.

Where counter proliferation is concerned, the next most powerful policy document is the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR). This document is first and foremost a platform to affirm America’s commitment to maintaining conventional deterrence by stockpiling the nuclear arsenal, though in this revision it just as strongly stands to reduce the strategic stockpile in

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<sup>9</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review*. [http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf)

accordance with the terms of the New START treaty<sup>10</sup>, signed just two days after the release of the NPR. In the NPR, we see a strengthening commitment to counter proliferation, with language referring to nuclear terrorism as “the most immediate and serious threat today[.]” There is no ambiguity in this declaration, unlike those in the superior documents. The NPR does briefly mention ballistic missile defense in the context of diminishing the deployed nuclear weapons stockpile, but is not the appropriate venue for the discussion of missile defense issues. Herein is the ultimate affirmation that the administration views ballistic missile defense and WMD counter proliferation as fundamentally disparate issues: ballistic missile defense has an entirely separate review report (along with the nuclear and space posture reviews).

The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR) uses a more modest vocabulary than the NPR. The BMDR affirms that ballistic missiles provide a dangerous delivery mechanism for WMDs and singles out the ballistic missile programs of North Korea and Iran. It claims that current missile defenses provide complete security for the territory of the United States against a limited ballistic missile attack, identifying China and Russia as the only two nations capable of executing an assault which could best the missile defenses. It also downplays the possibility or concern for such a missile shield-breaking assault, emphasizing the emerging threats over the existing ones.

The BMDR thus addresses two distinct classes of states: those presently capable of besting U.S. missile defenses, and those aspiring to develop technologies to do so. The strategic challenge to possessing a robust missile defense shield is that it lowers the opportunity cost of launching nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles by calling into question the ethicality of executing strikes against a nation which launched an assault in the knowledge it would fail. This

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<sup>10</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report*.  
<http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>

transforms aggressive missile launches from *de facto* declarations of war to much less impressive transactions of information, expressing urgent dissatisfaction with US policy. Further developing the ballistic missile defense shield will therefore provide no further defense against North Korea or Iran<sup>11</sup>, and will certainly provide no support against nuclear terrorism, the “most immediate and serious threat today.”

The final relevant policy document which addresses counter proliferation is the National Military Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMSCWMD). Unlike the higher documents discussed above, the NMSCWMD is not rewritten on a scheduled basis, and therefore has not been updated since 2006. Never-the-less, it is the single document which attempts to establish a comprehensive strategic framework to categorize counter proliferation programs. The 2002 NMSCWMD started to do this by defining three counter proliferation pillars: Nonproliferation, Counter proliferation, and Consequence Management. The 2006 version updated this framework by adding a new layer of categories underneath the pillars. These eight so called “Mission Areas” provide the basis for the empirical analysis presented in the next section.

In broad terms, Nonproliferation encompasses any programs which work directly with other nations to reduce or eliminate WMD threats. These programs include the mission areas of Security Cooperation, which is cooperative efforts with allies to reduce WMD threats, and Threat Reduction Cooperation, which comprises efforts to compel enemy nations and groups to cede their WMD capabilities voluntarily.

Counter proliferation (as a pillar of the larger counter proliferation effort) is comprised of any non-diplomatic programs to deter, defeat, or destroy the threat of WMDs. It includes five

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<sup>11</sup> For additional support of this point, see Williams, Cindy. “Budgets to Make America Safer”. The Stanley Foundation: Policy Analysis Brief. February 2006

mission areas: Offensive Operations, which are efforts to destroy WMDs or their supporting infrastructure to prevent their use; Elimination Operations, which are operations to systematically find and destroy an adversary's WMDs; Interdiction Operations, which intercept WMDs while they are being transported; Active defenses, which are programs designed to address a WMD attack while it is in process (e.g., missile defense); and finally Passive Defenses, which seek to deny adversary WMDs the capability to deal meaningful harm to targets (e.g., vaccines for common bioweapons).

The third pillar is its own singular mission area: consequence management. These programs seek to limit a WMD's effectiveness by increasing the target's ability to cope with the effects of the attack. These programs stand on a thin line between passive defenses. The distinguishing factor between the two mission areas is the time at which the system acts, relative to the attack. Programs designed to decontaminate an area affected by a bioweapon, for example, are consequence management programs, whereas programs designed to neutralize the bioweapon while it is in process are passive defenses.

The 2009 Counter proliferation Program Review Committee Report identified support for the counter proliferation pillars and mission areas within the supporting agencies for each. Table 1 shows the distribution of responsibilities, as seen in the 2008 fiscal year.

Counter proliferation Pillar	Mission Area	Supporting Agencies
Nonproliferation	Threat Reduction Cooperation	DTRA
	Security Cooperation and Partner Activities	DTRA
Counter proliferation	Interdiction	DTRA
	Elimination	DTRA
	Active Defense	MDA
	Offensive Operations	DTRA
	Passive Defense	CBDP, DTRA
Consequence Management	Consequence Management	CBDP, DTRA

Table 1: Counter proliferation Mission Areas and their Supporting Agencies

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) supports exactly one mission area. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program’s (CBDP) scope is also precise, supporting only two of the missions. The CBDP has been explicit on this point in its R-1 budget justifications<sup>12</sup>:

[The CBDP’s] mission is in direct support of the three pillars (non-proliferation, counter proliferation, and consequence management) of the National Strategy for Combating WMD. The DoD CBDP provides research, development, and acquisition (RDA) programs primarily to support the counter proliferation and consequence management pillars.

In stark contrast to MDA and CBDP, DTRA supports seven of the eight mission areas. If spending allocations were designed to provide an equitable distribution of funds across the Counter proliferation pillars or mission areas, then DTRA should receive a large majority of the funds, followed by CBDP, and finally MDA. However, the policy guidance has suggested that Missile Defense should receive, if anything, a *smaller* portion of funding, since its strategic goals defend against a threat about which the U.S. is not presently concerned (that is, a ballistic nuclear assault executed by Russia or China).

<sup>12</sup>Chemical and Biological Defense Program “Justification Book: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide – 0400”. February 2010. [http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget\\_justification/pdfs/03\\_RDT\\_and\\_E/CBDP\\_RDT\\_E\\_PB11.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/CBDP_RDT_E_PB11.pdf)

## **de facto Policy: What the U.S. Spends Money On**

In order to examine the relationship between policy and spending, this study leveraged budgetary data from Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Budgeted “defense-wide” (i.e., non armed forces) RDT&E programs supporting counter proliferation efforts were aggregated into a subset of the total budget allocated for fiscal year 2009. For the purposes of this study, only programs which are designated as counter proliferation programs (i.e., contribute to weapons systems designed to identify and destroy WMDs, or otherwise increase survivability of a WMD attack) were included.<sup>13</sup> Classified programs were excluded, along with those university or small business partnership programs which did not provide sufficient detail in their R-1 forms to categorize them definitively as supporting counter proliferation. This left 41 distinct programs from seven defense agencies. These programs were then submitted to the DTIC database using their unique “Program Element” (PE) identifiers for their respective R-1 forms. The individual line items listed on the R-1 forms were then paired with their respective program elements and funding, and then coded with the most appropriate corresponding counter proliferation pillar, mission area, and targeted types of weapons of mass destruction (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Missile)<sup>14</sup>.

Figure 1 shows the total spending on RDT&E (i.e. budget categories 6.1-6.7) for FY 2009 amongst the three agencies within the DoD devoted entirely to counter proliferation.

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<sup>13</sup> Ambiguous programs with the potential to support counter proliferation technologies (e.g. basic electronics research with applications for counter proliferation technologies *not explicitly designated as such*) were not classified.

<sup>14</sup> For more detail concerning the coding methodology, see Supplemental Material for *du Jour and de Facto Policy*




Figure 1: FY 2009 RDT&E Spending by Counter proliferation Agency

This graph, taken in context with the distribution of counter proliferation mission area responsibilities across the relevant defense agencies, suggests that the U.S. counter proliferation portfolio is unbalanced. It represents the exact opposite of the equitable relationship between the three agencies.

The discrepancy between the combined funding for DTRA and CBDP (which together support seven of the eight counter proliferation Mission Areas) and the funding for MDA (which supports a single mission area) indicate a strong political and financial bias in favor of MDA's mission area, Active Defense. Furthermore, the fact that CBDP supports two mission areas and MDA supports a third leaves five mission areas entirely funded by DTRA, the least well-funded of the three agencies. If those mission areas were funded uniformly, each would have received approximately \$100 million for fiscal year 2009. This number pales in comparison to the \$8 billion spent on missile defense in the same year.

This pattern is neither new, nor is it likely to disappear in the near future.




Figure 2: RDT&E Spending by CP Agency over Time

Figure two shows the distribution of RDT&E spending over the last seven years. The disproportionate bias in spending towards MDA is persistent, though it has trended downward in the last four years. Even so, the preponderance of spending on missile defense (a function of Active Defense, which is a mission under the “Counter proliferation” pillar) skews the balance of spending across the counter proliferation pillars strongly towards the “counter proliferation” pillar.




Figure 3: Distribution of 2009 RDT&E Funding Across Counter proliferation Pillar

As seen in Figure 3, Counter proliferation spending dominates the other pillars, though this may not be solely attributable to the political bias in favor of Active Defense. As we saw above, MDA commands slightly more than \$8 billion in RDT&E funds, while counter proliferation programs account from more than \$9 billion. This leaves more than an additional billion dollars in the counter proliferation programs column, still well in excess of the amount of the next largest account, consequence management.




Figure 4: RDT&E Spending Across CP Pillars, excluding Active Defense

Figure 4 represents the same information as figure 3, only discounting Active Defense programs (which comprise the entirety of the MDA RDT&E budget). While the scale of the difference between counter proliferation and the other two pillars is reduced, the general topography remains the same: counter proliferation spending more than doubles spending in either of the other pillars. We must look at the data in higher resolution to infer anything further.




Figure 5: Distribution of FY 2009 RDT&E Spending over Counter proliferation Mission Area

Figure 5 provides the necessary resolution by showing spending across the counter proliferation mission areas. In figure 5 we see a reaffirmation of the preponderance of spending on active defenses. If we exclude that column, however, we can examine the remaining mission areas in much greater detail. Such a graph can be seen below in Figure 6.




Figure 6: Figure 5 Excluding Active Defense

The distribution of funds across the remaining mission areas is a reflection of using RDT&E spending to operationalize government priority. Offensive operations, elimination operations, and interdiction are all fundamentally force missions: they require intelligence and manpower, and not necessarily new technologies. Passive defense and consequence management are technology-dependent mission areas, and thus we considerably larger RDT&E investments. Finally, security partnerships and threat reduction cooperation are more diplomatic efforts than military, and thus require less technological innovation than the others. This leaves active defense as the puzzling outlier.

One possible reason for this outlier effect might be uncertainty within the analysis. In addition to the programs selected for their direct relevance to the US counter proliferation missions, there were an additional 17 programs with insufficient available information to make a definitive determination of their relevance. Such programs broadly fall into two categories: those that are classified, and those that are distributed across many projects in partnerships with small-businesses or universities. These programs represent approximately \$5 billion (\$4.3 billion of which is listed as a single classified program with no details), only a small fraction of which is probably invested in counter proliferation programs of any variety.

If, hypothetically, all of these funds directly supported counter proliferation programs other than active defense, then perhaps they represent enough variation in the numbers to normalize the spending a little better and thereby bring the counter proliferation technology portfolio into a better balance.




Figure 7: Magnitude of Indeterminate Elements of Counter proliferation Spending

Figure 7 superimposes a bar reflecting this indeterminate sum of money onto the content of figure 5. Even if we were to assume that *all* of the unspoken-for funds were spent on counter proliferation mission, and that they were distributed uniformly, or even exclusively to the second-most financially supported mission area, passive defense, active defense spending would overshadow other CP missions handily. In this way the uncertainty reinforces the magnitude of the discrepancy between active defense and the other counter proliferation missions: Active defense costs more than the sum of all other counter proliferation missions, all of the DoD’s university and small business partnerships, and all defense-wide classified RDT&E spending *combined*.

In addition to mission areas, programs were coded with their respective WMD types (i.e., which WMDs the programs are designed to counter). Across this categorization we observe a

more uniform distribution (with the obvious, already discussed outlier of missile defenses).

Figure 8 graphs this relationship.




Figure 8: Distribution of FY 2009 RDT&E funds over Counterweapon Type

Besides missile defense, this is a curious distribution. The official policy suggests that spending to counter chemical warfare should be declining, yet it exceeds spending in both radiological and nuclear programs. These numbers are sufficiently small that the aforementioned uncertainty attributed to classified programs and the likes may be enough to correct or otherwise alter this balance, but again it fails to equate to enough funding to counter the overspending on ballistic missile defense programs.

The greater spending on chemical defenses may also be a product of spending overlap. Many programs support biological and chemical defenses (e.g., a gas mask may be able to protect a soldier from either variety of attack). Likewise, programs defending against radiological attacks will support technologies which would be useful in the wake of a nuclear attack, and so nuclear and radiological systems are often paired together. Other pairings also exist, like the occasional program which supports Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear

(CBRN) defense, though they are far less prevalent. The greater spending on chemical programs may be a product of the frequency with which biological defense programs overlap with chemical defense applications. The increased spending on biological defense, on the other hand, is perfectly consistent with the promulgated US policies.

### **Concerns and Conclusion**

This study applies a military strategic framework to analyze military fund distributions. From this we can infer that the policy language, which strongly suggested that missile defense should receive less funding than other counter proliferation missions, does not actually correlate with lower spending on missile defense. Within the other counter proliferation missions, there is little reason to believe that the policy does not inform the distribution of funds, though the classification of relevant information restricts our ability to make such inferences definitively.

This approach is not without its faults and downfalls. Besides the problem of classified information, as a guide to categorization, the strategic framework laid out in the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction is imperfect. While the pillars are sufficiently broad and well-defined in their scope, the mission areas lack an appropriate category for conventional deterrence activities, such as research to maintain a nuclear arsenal. More broadly, being a fundamentally military framework, they fixate on the roles the armed forces should fill to protect the US and its allies from a nonconventional attack. The Departments of Energy and State also play very meaningful roles in the larger efforts to diminish threats worldwide, though those efforts cannot be coded within this framework.

Despite these concerns, the overwhelming preponderance of spending on Missile Defense in lieu of more effective and useful counter proliferation policies is still evident. We have

empirically demonstrated a troubling disjoint in the US Planning Programming, Budgeting and Execution System that other analysts have only noted anecdotally<sup>15</sup>. In the presence of such a dramatic disjoint between the *du jour* policy (which is written) and the *de facto* (which is funded), many new questions emerge: what systemic bias causes this disproportionate dispersion of funds? Can it be remedied without an overhaul of the Defense PPBES? Only future research on the matter can tell.

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<sup>15</sup> For example, see Adams and Williams, *Buying National Security*